Alternative for Israel: will the opposition be able to oust Netanyahu

The preliminary results of the Israeli Knesset elections deprived the bloc of incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of a guaranteed majority, opening a window of opportunity for the opposition. His opponent, Gadi Eizenkot, the leader of the Yashar! party, is theoretically capable of forming a coalition and leading Israel out of the political impasse. To do this, he will have to play a difficult chess game: enter into an unprecedented alliance with parties representing the interests of the Arab population or try to split the religious bloc supporting Netanyahu. However, according to experts interviewed by Izvestia, the opposition's maneuvers still do not guarantee its triumph in the long term.

The coalitions are at an impasse

Voter turnout in the October 27 parliamentary elections exceeded forecasts. According to the CEC of Israel, by the time polling stations were closed, it was 77.7% (a record for the past three decades), and in some areas it was close to 100%.

However, the parity of the opposing camps was a much more serious surprise. So, according to the results of preliminary calculations (by the time 85% of the votes were processed), the government camp can count on 53-54 seats, Gadi Aizenkot's opposition bloc — on 47-49. From 17 to 19 seats, according to estimates, will go to Arab parties.

There is still room for adjustments: The CEC did not start counting the so—called "double envelopes" - ballots of military personnel, diplomats, prisoners, as well as other groups of the population who voted remotely (about 600 thousand votes). However, they are unlikely to have a fundamental impact on the overall picture: none of the blocs reaches the 61 mandates required to form a government. This, in turn, pushes both camps to build broader post-election alliances.

Political analyst Advan Hisham, in an interview with Izvestia, called the situation both standard and unique for the political field of the Jewish state. There have already been cases in the history of Israel when the heavyweight parties did not have enough resources of their own to build a stable and at the same time small coalition. This was usually solved by forming a broader and more "diverse" alliance. However, this time the opponents' resources are severely limited, and inter-factional diplomacy is much more strongly influenced by the contradictions that have accumulated in recent years than in previous cycles. If the mandates are distributed incorrectly, any new government risks quickly becoming mired in internal strife, Hisham noted.

Given that the problem of the crisis in relations is equally acute for both the government camp and the opposition, the formation of a new balance of power may be difficult even if the ruling Likud party retains the majority of mandates.

Arab parties form a proposal

The unusually high level of support for parties representing the interests of the Arab-Bedouin population of Israel significantly affected the balance of power. The votes of these voters remain the lever that the opposition will sooner or later have to use to get a "controlling stake" of mandates.

But there is no consensus in the "Arab camp" (as some Israeli media call it) on the terms of possible participation in the ruling coalition. For example, the largest RAAM party (which claims 6 seats) already intends to become part of the new government headed by Aizenkot and get closer to the centrist parties. As a sign of the seriousness of their intentions, RAAM even invited Yoav Segalovich, an ex-deputy of the Yashar! union opposition Yesh Atid party, who previously headed the national unit for combating serious crimes.

The United List (a coalition of the Hadash, Taal and Balad parties) is also ready to express support for the current opposition and even "gift" its mandates to it, but only if a number of political demands of the Arab minority are fulfilled. Among other things, the leader of the platform, Youssef Jabarin, demanded that the future government finance measures to combat crime in the periphery (and thereby change the criminal situation in Arab neighborhoods), reduce the intensity of military operations in neighboring countries and stop settlement expansion to the West Bank. Otherwise, the new government will not be able to get the support of the Arab electorate.

The opposition is not ready to make concessions

Despite the fact that only the Eisenkot bloc has the option to use the "Arab lever" (especially given that the current Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu had previously ruled out a tactical alliance with both the RAAM and the Joint List, calling them "anti-Zionists"), it will not be so easy to reach a compromise. Not all parties of the Eisenkot bloc agree to cooperate with pro-Arab forces.

In addition, the position of the leadership of Yashar! also needs to be clarified. Back in September 2026, when the political blocs were discussing a strategy for forming inter—party relations, Eisenkot rather categorically described the limits of cooperation with pro-Arab political forces. Among other things, he demanded concessions from his counterpart: the official positioning of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, the adoption of the values of the Declaration of Independence, as well as the recognition of Hamas as a terrorist organization that must be eliminated.

As Vladimir Abdulaev, an expert on Israeli electoral technologies, noted in an interview with Izvestia, such a serious difference of views can become an obstacle in developing a coordinated policy of a hypothetical coalition. Especially if the bet is made on the help of Arab parties.

Both RAAM and the Joint List blame specific politicians for all the troubles of the Arab population of Israel — Prime Minister Netanyahu, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir. However, the desire to replace the Prime Minister and his entourage does not guarantee close coordination with the opposition. If the counter-terms of the Jewish parties from the Eisenkot bloc turn out to be inflexible, the Arab parties from the "Joint List" will most likely prefer to stay on the sidelines and "play against everyone." At the same time, the support of RAAM alone will not be enough to form a parliamentary preponderance of the opposition," the expert believes.

Moreover, even if positions are adjusted, the participation of Arab parties in the work of the coalition may become an additional vulnerability factor. Especially if Arab parliamentarians boycott the coalition's decisions or disrupt the vote in case of a disagreement on the Palestinian issue.

Therefore, an alternative course of action for the opposition camp may be to divide the camp of opponents; mainly, to split the religious bloc, on which Likud and other parties of Netanyahu's platform rely in many ways. Moreover, the ruling coalition's excessive lobbying of the interests of ultra-Orthodox Jews has alienated a part of the conservative (but not so radically minded) religious electorate. Therefore, a competent game of spiritual and moral contradictions is quite capable of sowing discord between Netanyahu's supporters and giving the Eisenkot bloc several additional mandates.

However, such a game also has its price. Accelerating the polarization of Israeli society will further segment the Knesset and create additional space for intrigue and factional rivalry. That will also not add stability to the new government. There is a high risk that at some point the Israeli parliament will plunge into a state of "political leapfrog" - as in the period from 2019 to 2022, when five consecutive election campaigns took place in the country.