Linked by one cipher: Russian satellites will protect against cyber attacks
Russia intends to strengthen the protection of communications satellites from cyber attacks. For this purpose, it is planned to use certified cryptographic protection tools based on domestic algorithms in spacecraft control systems. The relevant requirements are provided for by the draft amendments to the law "On Communications" developed by the Ministry of Finance. Currently, there are no mandatory uniform requirements for cryptographic protection of radio control lines for communication and broadcasting satellites, experts say. In their opinion, uniform rules and the use of proven protective equipment will reduce the risks of interference in the operation of space systems. Such threats are not theoretical: attempts to disrupt satellite communications have already been recorded both in Russia and abroad.
What kind of protection is required for Russian space communications
It is planned to protect Russian communications satellites from cyber attacks using certified cryptographic protection tools. The requirements for them will be determined by relevant departments, including the Ministry of Finance, follows from the draft amendments to the law "On Communications" developed by the ministry. They are included in the upcoming package of measures "Anti-fraud 3.0".
Modern working conditions in the space sector require, among other things, the improvement of security mechanisms, the Ministry of Finance told Izvestia.
— This measure, included in Anti-Fraud 3.0, is primarily aimed at protecting information in the control lines of Russian communications satellites. The applied means of cryptographic information protection should use Russian trusted algorithms, they said.
Izvestia also sent inquiries to Gazprom Space Systems (the operator of the Yamal satellite constellation). In the State Enterprise "Space Communications" (State Enterprise CS, manages the satellite constellation "Express") They noted that it is more correct to contact the developers of the document.
Now each operator independently decides how to protect spacecraft control systems, a source in the satellite communications market told Izvestia. According to him, the lack of uniform requirements can make it difficult to protect against all possible threats. General rules and the use of cryptographic solutions tested by relevant government agencies will help reduce risks, the Izvestia interlocutor believes.
So far, Russia has not had requirements for mandatory cryptographic protection of radio control lines for communications and broadcasting satellites, said Leonid Konik, a partner at ComNews Research. But, on the contrary, there are precedents of cyber attacks on space communications systems, and they are recorded both in Russia and abroad. In 2023, the Russian satellite operator Dozor-Teleport was subjected to a cyberattack, which, according to a number of sources, was backed by Ukrainian hackers, Akhmetzhan Makhmutov, ex-Minister of Digital Development of the Vologda Region, told Izvestia. In the same year, the SOE CS reported on tens of thousands of attempts to interrupt television broadcasting on Russian spacecraft.
— In the international arena, the most famous example is the attack on Viasat's KA—SAT network in February 2022, which disabled thousands of modems and disrupted communications in a significant part of Europe. And in 2026, a critical vulnerability was reported in the NASA software, which theoretically made it possible to control satellites,— Akhmetzhan Makhmutov said.
Today, satellite control systems, especially in the segment of low-orbit groups, use standard protocols that were designed in an era when no one seriously thought about cyber warfare in space, the expert noted.
— The main problem is fragmentation, when each communication line, each type of information is protected by its own separate means of cryptographic protection. This creates a "patchwork" security, where the common perimeter turns out to be permeable due to the weakest link," Akhmetzhan Makhmutov added.
However, it is not necessary for attackers to try to crack the encryption itself. They can look for vulnerabilities in the software of ground stations through which they control satellites, the expert noted. Therefore, according to him, it is necessary to protect the entire chain of command transmission — from the operator's workplace to the equipment on board the device.
How do intruders threaten spacecraft
Experts name several major threats to satellite communications.
The first is the interception and substitution of control commands, Akhmetzhan Makhmutov said. If an attacker gains access to the appropriate channel, he can try not only to intercept data, but also to send a false command to the satellite, for example, to change its operating mode or disable part of the equipment, the expert explained.
The second threat is the disruption of communication. Denial of service (DoS) attacks, jamming or signal substitution can disrupt broadcasting and communications in certain regions for several hours or even days, Akhmetzhan Makhmutov pointed out.
The third is the information leak. Insufficient protection of communication channels can pose a threat to both the service data needed to control the device and the information transmitted through the satellite infrastructure, he noted.
If an attacker gains access to the satellite's control system, he can disrupt the operation of on-board equipment and leave users without communication, NTI information security expert Andrey Priemykhov agrees. According to him, cryptographic protection should not only hide official information from outsiders, but also allow checking whether the command really came from the control center. In addition, the system must block the repeated execution of a command that the attacker previously intercepted and is trying to send to the satellite again. It is necessary to protect the entire information transmission path from the control center to the spacecraft, the expert emphasized.
"For the Russian satellite infrastructure, I consider it justified to use domestic cryptographic protection, which can be verified and maintained within the country," he added.
At the same time, cyber attacks are not the only threat to the satellite infrastructure, Leonid Konik noted. In his opinion, in recent years, conventional radio interference has become less of a risk to communications and broadcasting satellites, while deliberate collisions of spacecraft, as well as their physical destruction from the Ground, can pose a serious danger.
China demonstrated the possibility of such a defeat back in January 2007. Then, with the help of anti-satellite weapons, the Chinese meteorological satellite FY-1C, located at an altitude of about 860 km, was destroyed, the expert recalled.
"The Chinese experiment has made a lot of noise, but until recently it seemed like it was just a one—time demonstration of such capabilities," he stressed.
The use of foreign solutions in the field of cryptography and information security puts the country's space infrastructure in direct dependence on external political decisions, said Dmitry Kuzyakin, Chief designer of the Central Design Bureau. The precedent with the revocation of SSL certificates from Russian resources by Western certification centers has clearly demonstrated the threat of using third-party standards, he said. Although the market has adapted to that situation, such dependence cannot be allowed in critical industries, and especially in space exploration. The transition to unified national security standards is long overdue, the expert believes.
The new requirements should unify the approach to the safety of spacecraft control systems. While operators now largely independently determine which solutions to use for these tasks, after the amendments are adopted, the requirements for cryptographic tools and algorithms used will be established by authorized agencies.
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