The Baltic Sight: how the lifting of the nuclear ban in Lithuania changes the strategic balance in the region

The Lithuanian Seimas has previously approved the exclusion from the Constitution of the ban on the deployment of nuclear weapons and foreign military bases in the country. So far, we are talking about the legal possibility, not the actual deployment of weapons. Nevertheless, Vilnius' initiative aimed at deeper integration into the NATO deterrence architecture risks provoking a new round of escalation in the Baltic region. Moscow has already stated that if such weapons appear, the republic will be "in the crosshairs" of Russian strategic forces, which will require major adjustments to the contours of regional military planning. For more information, see the "Izvestia" article.

Legal dismantling of the barrier

Lithuania has launched a mechanism to amend the basic law of the republic, potentially removing the last legal barrier to the country's participation in the nuclear architecture of the North Atlantic Alliance. We are talking about the repeal of article 137, which currently explicitly prohibits the deployment of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, as well as foreign military bases in the country.

The procedure was initiated on July 3, when an amendment to delete the article was registered by 50 deputies. "" On July 7, the Seimas approved it at the first stage (89 votes "for", 11 — "against", six abstained). The second stage of voting, held on September 22, demonstrated even greater consolidation of parliament: 99 deputies supported the amendment, 13 opposed, five abstained.

According to Lithuanian legislation, no final decision has been made yet. The document has been submitted to the relevant committees for consideration, after which the Seimas must hold two more votes with an interval of three months. According to Parliament Speaker Juozas Oljakas, the next vote is scheduled for October 6, and the final consideration of the initiative may take place on January 12, 2027.

The motives of Vilnius

The official position of the Lithuanian leadership is based on the thesis of the need to adapt to new geopolitical realities. President Gitanas Nauseda called the current constitutional norm outdated, explaining the initiative as a transformation of the security environment. In July, the head of state openly declared Lithuania's desire to become an "integral part" of the NATO nuclear deterrent system.

Speaker of the Seimas Juozas Olekas argued for the need to amend the principles of the Alliance's collective defense, noting that with the current ban, Lithuania looks like a "black sheep" within NATO, remaining the only state in the bloc with such a constitutional restriction. The Lithuanian authorities emphasize that we are not talking about the automatic deployment of ammunition in peacetime.

Nevertheless, the relevant departments take a more pragmatic position. In early June, Lithuanian Defense Minister Robertas Kaunas announced negotiations with the United States on the possible deployment of American nuclear weapons on national territory.

However, the legal repeal of article 137 and the actual deployment of weapons are fundamentally different stages. According to military analysts, after the constitutional change, a separate political decision on the format of the presence will be required. This process may include the preparation of specific airfield infrastructure, the deployment of dual-use aircraft, and full participation in nuclear planning mechanisms.

Architecture of the NATO Nuclear Circuit

The current NATO nuclear sharing system is built around American weapons in Europe and the infrastructure of the allied countries. According to the Alliance's doctrine, the United States retains full control and responsibility for the deployed munitions, while European partners provide carriers, airfields, guards and conventional support forces.

The main political mechanism in this system is the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). As of 2026, American B61 tactical aerial bombs are deployed at facilities in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. In parallel, the French (non-NPG) and British nuclear components are developing in the Alliance.

The NATO leadership has consistently emphasized the importance of this component. In July, the Alliance's Secretary General Mark Rutte described the American nuclear umbrella as the "ultimate guarantee" of the bloc's security. On June 18, the NPG issued a statement on further strengthening the nuclear mission, modernizing capabilities, and strengthening planning, which officially stated the purpose of "preserving peace, preventing coercion, and deterring aggression."

The geographical factor and Moscow's response

The reaction of the Russian leadership to Vilnius' actions turned out to be predictably harsh. On July 8, Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov warned that the deployment of nuclear weapons in the Baltic States would "significantly increase the level of danger" and entail Russian countermeasures. On September 11, the Kremlin's rhetoric became tougher: Peskov called the lifting of the ban a serious escalation, stressing that in the event of nuclear weapons aimed at Russia, Lithuania would be "at gunpoint" by Russian forces. On the same day, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev expressed doubt that such a step would automatically increase the security of the republic.

Moscow's position is not limited to assessing the Lithuanian case, but affects the entire European nuclear architecture. Thus, the Ambassador-at-large of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Andrei Belousov, stated the need to withdraw American nuclear weapons from Europe and dismantle the relevant infrastructure. From the point of view of the Russian Federation, American ammunition deployed in Europe, given their range and the nature of possible targets, is actually becoming a strategic factor.

— Taking into account the possibility of damaging the most important civilian and military infrastructure facilities in Russia, the American nuclear weapons deployed in Europe are essentially strategic. Therefore, we insist that it be withdrawn from Europe, returned to the United States, and the entire infrastructure for its deployment in Europe be dismantled," the diplomat stressed.

In 2026, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov also repeatedly warned about the growing risks of a direct clash between Russia and NATO amid the strengthening of the military capabilities of the European countries of the Alliance.

The main reason for Moscow's sharp reaction to Lithuanian initiatives is the geographical location of the republic. Lithuania is located between the Kaliningrad Region (one of the main Russian military regions in the Baltic) and Belarus, which is deeply integrated with the Russian Federation in the military sphere.

The Kaliningrad exclave already has a powerful echelon defense. """"According to open data, operational tactical complexes "Iskander-M" (with a range of up to 500 km), S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems (up to 400 km for individual missile variants), as well as coastal missile systems "Bastion" and "Ball", forming a separate contour of control of the coastal zone, are deployed there. Thus, the possible emergence of a NATO nuclear infrastructure in Lithuania will overlap with the already existing, high-density complex of Russian missile, aviation, anti-aircraft and electronic capabilities.

Belarus is an additional factor. On May 21, the Russian Defense Ministry officially announced the delivery of nuclear munitions to field storage facilities in the republic during joint exercises using "Iskander-M" complexes. This has become a publicly confirmed element of the Russian-Belarusian outline of non-strategic nuclear deterrence. The potential deployment of American funds in Lithuania will change not so much the total volume of the Alliance's nuclear potential as its geography, creating a new potential hub directly in the Baltic region.

Transformation of military planning

In practical terms, the repeal of Article 137 poses a new strategic challenge for Moscow: in the future, Lithuania will have to be considered not just as a NATO territory, but as a potential part of the Alliance's nuclear contour. According to experts, this will inevitably increase the importance of reconnaissance, electronic warfare, aerial surveillance and air defense/missile defense systems in the north-western direction. The requirements for protecting our own control points and increasing the survivability of mobile missile systems will increase.

In turn, Lithuania is simultaneously accelerating the development of conventional defense. In May, Deputy Defense Minister Karolis Alexa stated that Vilnius considers Russia as a key threat (noting that the conflict scenario is no longer perceived as remote), and air defense and counter-unmanned capabilities are named priorities for defense construction.

The regional configuration on NATO's eastern flank is becoming increasingly dense. A single chain is being built: Poland (as an element of strategic depth and missile defense infrastructure), Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (providing airfields and radar facilities for the Baltic Air Policing mission).

The Strategic Paradox

The main military-strategic fork of the current moment lies in the difference in perception. For Vilnius, the dismantling of article 137 and nuclear sharing mechanisms is a way to expand security guarantees and increase the price of potential aggression while formally maintaining the status of a non—nuclear state.

For Russia, this step means the need to integrate Lithuania into the nuclear planning circuit in the Kaliningrad and Belarusian directions. A strategic paradox arises: a measure designed to strengthen the republic's security objectively increases its military-strategic importance as a potential target. The question boils down to whether the political and legal process in Vilnius will lead to a banal buildup of strike and intelligence capabilities on both sides of the Baltic.

Today, the key fact remains unchanged: Lithuania is only going through the first legal stage of lifting constitutional restrictions. A real transformation of the regional balance of power will begin only if a change in the Basic Law is followed by practical decisions on the deployment of NATO infrastructure.